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COMMENTS
DISPUTED USES OF DEBT BY
SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
There has been considerable controversy' over interpretation of the
requirement that there be only one class of stock in a subchapter S
corporation.2 It is a simple matter to draft instruments which conform
literally with the statutory requirement. However, in certain situa-
tions, typically involving ostensible debt instruments, the Commission-
er has challenged the formal designation, arguing that the facts indicate
that for tax purposes there are at least two classes of stock.3 This Note
will examine, primarily in relation to the one class requirement, the
question whether for tax purposes a given instrument is to be treated as
debt or stock. More specifically, the following will be considered: first,
application of the so-called "thin capitalization" doctrine4 to find pur-
ported debt in fact to be a disqualifying second class of stock; second,
the soundness of an alternative approach recently suggested by the Tax
Court which would treat disputed advances as a non-disqualifying con-
tribution to the existing class of stock; I third, the rationale of the one
'See, e.g., Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalization of Corp-
orations, 13 VAND. L. REv. 185 (1959) ; Manly, Election under Subchapter S can
elimnhate thin4incorporation problem, 9 J. TAXATION 322 (1958) ; Salkin, What
the courts and the Commissioner have been saybg about Subchapter S, 24 J.
TAxATioi 116 (1966).
" INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1371 (a): "For purposes of this subchapter, the term
'small business corporation' means a domestic corporation which . . . does not . . .
have more than one class of stock."
This requirement applies only to stock which is issued and outstanding. Con-
sequently, treasury stock and unissued stock of a second class will not cause
disqualification. Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959).
'The Commissioner has challenged ostensible debt instruments in the following
cases: Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v. Kennedy, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9293 (D. Wyo.
1966); Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965); W. C.
Gamman, 46 T.C.-, No. 1, CCH TAx CT. REP., decision 27,900, P-H TAx CT.
REP. 1 46.1 (1966); Catalina Homes, Inc., 65 P-H Tax Ct. Mein. 1491 (1964).
'The thin capitalization doctrine is a shorthand reference to the approach
developed in many cases which have found that a corporation was inadequately
capitalized and that ostensible debt instruments were, for tax purposes, actually
stock See, e.g., Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957); Bruce v.
Knox, 180 F. Supp. 907 (D. Minn. 1960); Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 31
(1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951). See generally Bittker,
Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 10 U. FLA. L. R-v. 25 (1957);
Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TEH INsT. ON FED. TAx
771 (1959) ; Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization"
and Related Problemns, 16 TAx L. REv. 1 (1960).5 W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C.- , No. 1, CCH TAx CT. RE,., decision 27,900,
P-H Tax Ct Rep. 46.1 (1966).
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class requirement; fourth, a suggested approach to resolving contro-
versies involving disputed debt instruments of subchapter S corpora-
tions.
I. APPLICATION OF THE TIN CAPITALIZATION
DOCTRINE TO SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATIONS
The Code itself provides no explanation or reason for the one class
requirement and the congressional reports on the 1958 Technical
Amendments Act are equally unrevealing.6 Lacking specific guide-
lines, the Commissioner has adopted a restrictive interpretation.
Regulation 1.1371-1(g) 7 provides that if outstanding shares do not
provide identical rights and interests in the control, profits, and assets
of the corporation, there is more than one class of stock. Differences in
voting rights, dividend rights, or liquidation preferences will be dis-
qualifying. Specifically referring to debt, the regulation's final sentence
states, "If an instrument purporting to be a debt obligation is actually
stock, it will constitute a second class of stock."8 This statement has
generally been interpreted as incorporating the thin capitalization
doctrine into subchapter S.9
Any discussion of the thin capitalization doctrine is complicated by
the fact that the doctrine itself cannot be summarized succinctly. As
used hereafter, "thin capitalization" denotes a capital structure in
which the ratio of debt to stock is weighted heavily in favor of debt
instruments. ° Normally such capital structures are used, generally by
closely-held corporations with the shareholders holding the debt instru-
ments, because of substantial tax benefits offered by debt." When it is
'The Senate report simply states that the corporation "may not have more
than one class of stock." S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87; 1958-3
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4877 (1958).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1959).
B Ibid.
See Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporatiots,
13 VAND. L. REV. 185 (1959) ; Hrousoff, Election, Operation and Termination of a
Subchapter S Corporation, 11 VILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1965). The possibility of applying
the thin capitalization doctrine to subchapter S corporations was recognized even before
the regulations appeared. See Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Cor-
porate Election and Collapsible Amendment, 58 CoLuM. L. REV. 1146, 1152 (1958).
"°It is not possible to state mechanically the point at which the ratio may
appear excessive. What is excessive in one industry may be normal in another.
See Bittker, supra note 4, at 28.
n As outlined by Professor Bittker, debt may be used for any of the following
reasons:
1. The corporation is entitled to deduct any interest paid on indebtedness,
whereas dividends, being considered a distribution of profits, are not similarly
deductible.
2. Payment at maturity may constitute a "reasonable business need" under§ 533(a) which helps to avoid the accumulated earnings tax of § 531.
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clear that the amount of "debt" used is dictated solely by tax con-
siderations, courts have applied the thin capitalization doctrine and
disregarded the debt designation. 2 However, because it is still true
that even a fairly high ratio may be justified by business considera-
tions, 3 the courts have considered a number of factors relevant to
determination of whether a thin capital structure is legitimate.
Obviously, a prime factor is the particular debt/equity ratio in-
volved, and the early cases often seem to make this factor determina-
tive. 4 Later decisions began to consider additional factors such as
whether the instruments were held pro rata by the shareholders, 15 or
whether the funds represented by the debt were used to purchase assets
essential to the formation of the business. 6 More recent cases have
suggested that the issue turns on subjective factors, particularly the
holder's "intent" to treat his debt claims as would any other creditor.'
If the test is solely subjective, it may be a misnomer to use the label
"thin capitalization doctrine" because the requisite intent may not be
related to the "thinness" of the debt/equity ratio. However, in practice
3. Payment of debt will ordinarily either be tax-free to the recipient or
produce capital gain whereas stock redemptions are often taxed as dividends.
4. Debt may be transferred without any loss of control.
5. An initial issue of debt is without tax consequences whereas a later issue
will ordinarily be taxed as a dividend.
6. Debt may sometimes give ordinary loss treatment on worthlessness, whereas
worthlessness on stock generally produces a capital loss.
See BITTKER, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
111-12 (1965). As will be seen, under subchapter S the reasons for using debt
are considerably different See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
2 See cases and authorities cited in note 4 supra.
"Royalty Service Corp. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mont 1959).
See HERWITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS PLANNING, pt. I, at 95 (temp.
ed. 1963).
" See Dobkin v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d
392 (2d Cir. 1951); Note, Thin Capitalization and Tax Avoidance, 55 COLUm.
L. REv. 1054, 1061 n.51 (1955) and cases cited therein. There have been attempts
to determine what is a "safe" ratio. Based on Talbot Mills v. Commissioner, 146
F2d 809 (1st Cir. 1944), aff'd sub non. John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326
U.S. 521 (1946), it was thought that 4:1 marked the boundary of the safe area.
SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 1195
(1962). For discussion of the 4:1 ratio test, see Caplin, The Caloric Count of a
Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAX 771, 783-84 (1959).
"1432 Broadway Corp. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1158 (1945), aff'd per curiam,
160 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1947). In Leach Corp., 30 T.C. 563 (1958), the absence of
pro rata holding of debt and equity was emphasized. It has been pointed out
that only in the case of pro rata holding is there a maximum incentive to issue
debt. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 6-7. However, even if holding is not pro rata,
the court may classify the debt as stock. Reed v. Commissioner, 242 F2d 334
(2d Cir. 1957).
"6Schnitzer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 43 (1949), aff'd per curiam 183 F.2d 70
(9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 911 (1951). The validity of regarding this
as an important factor has been questioned. See BITTRER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 116.
'The leading case is Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 408
(1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956).
[VOL. 41 :856
the Commissioner will have no reason to dispute a low ratio.'" Further-
more, courts will probably continue to consider the ratio when seeking
to establish a taxpayer's true intent.' 9 Because other tests will not be
reached until a high ratio is shown, the following discussion will focus
on tax consequences of establishing a high debt/equity ratio in a sub-
chapter S corporation. In two cases in which debt/equity ratios of
subchapter S corporations have been questioned, the courts have ap-
plied the thin capitalization doctrine.
In Henderson v. United States,20 the corporation made a subchapter
S election at its inception. The taxpayer-shareholder and other share-
holders made pro rata advances during the second year of operation
despite continuing losses. The Commissioner disallowed loss deduc-
tions taken by the shareholder. The district court held that the evi-
dence established that the advances were capital investments and
constituted a second class of stock, thereby disqualifying the corpora-
tion under subchapter S. The court, in holding that the advances were
in fact equity, cited prior cases in which the debt-or-equity issue had
been decided. 21 These cases indicated that, in general, the answer de-
pended on an overall evaluation of the true nature of the relationship
created by the advance. Relevant factors were whether the advances
were pro rata, or essential to the inception of the business and whether
there was adequate security given or any attempt to enforce the obliga-
tions.
The court's reliance on prior authority implies that although all the
cited cases involved normal corporate tax treatment,22 the same tests
should be applied when a subchapter S corporation is thinly capital-
ized. The conclusion reached by the Henderson court is by no means
inevitable because of substantial tax differences between subchapter S
"'The cases seem to indicate that a ratio below 4:1 is seldom of any help to
the Commissioner. Goldstein, stpra note 4, at 20.
"D See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 18 n.92, where the author argues that the courts
are still concerned with debt/equity ratios.
Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
The court cited, e.g., Montclair, Inc. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 38 (5th
Cir. 1963); 0. H. Kruse Grain & Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123(9th Cir. 1960); United States v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 133 F.2d 990(6th Cir. 1943). None of the cases involved subchapter S corporations.
"Ibid. For a recent case involving debt and a subchapter S corporation, see
Seven Sixty Ranch Co. v. Kennedy, 66-1 U.S. Tax Cas. II 9893 (D. Wyo. 1966),
holding promissory notes given by a corporation as evidence of loans received
from its sole stockholder did not constitute a second class of stock so as to dis-
qualify the corporation under subchapter S. The court reasoned that genuine
debt existed because the loans were not made at the corporation's inception. The sole
stockholder did not intend to acquire additional equity, and he at all times intended
to create a genuine debtor-creditor relationship.
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and normal corporate tax provisions.3 For example, under subchapter
S, the benefit of a deduction for interest payments is absent because the
corporation pays no taxes24 and the shareholder reports both interest
and dividend payments as ordinary income.3 In Catalina Homes,
Inc.,26 the petitioner made this point in arguing against the use of the
thin capitalization doctrine.
In Catalina, the subchapter S corporation made profits for the
year in question and distributed them without declaring a formal
dividend. The corporation had a high debt/equity ratio and the Com-
missioner determined that the purported debt was a disqualifying
second class of stock. The taxpayer argued that the advances should
be treated as loans because the shareholders would pay the same total
tax whether the distributions were labelled interest or dividends. The
court conceded the taxpayer's point but still applied the doctrine,
stating that the interest deduction was not the only advantage which
followed from debt and noting several advantages attendant to thin
capitalization." The advantages indicated by the court were all drawn
from normal corporate taxation and do not offer identical benefits
under subchapter S.82 Thus, it is pertinent to ask just what are the
advantages of debt under subchapter S provisions?
A relatively clear instance arises when current earnings and profits
exceed taxable income. 9 Ordinarily, of course, a subchapter S cor-
poration's earnings and profits account for a given year will be zero
because the shareholders will have been taxed on both actual distribu-
Manly, supra note 1, at 323.
o' Ixr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372, provides that "any small business corporation
may elect... not to be subject to the taxes imposed by this chapter."
SIINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a). Because subchapter S eliminates "double
taxation" of corporate income, § 1375(b) denies the dividends received exclusion
of § 116 and the dividends received credit of § 34.
'65 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1491 (1964).
' The court pointed to the following issues: (1) whether distributions are
deductible interest payments or dividends; (2) whether a corporate payment is
deductible as a cost of goods sold or is a dividend; (3) whether a corporation
realizes income on cancellation of shareholder-held debt; (4) whether an advance
qualifies as a loan for purposes of taking a bad debt deduction; (5) whether re-
payment of an advance is a tax-free repayment of a loan or a dividend.
Under subchapter S, the interest deduction issue,(1), is moot. See note 24
supra and accompanying text. There is no need to seek bad debt deductions, (4),
because losses are taken directly by the shareholder. See SuEy & WAREN, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 1189. Under subchapter S the loan repayment issue seems to present
the only significant problem. See text discussion accompanying notes 29-62 infra.
2 Ibid.
'The effect of an income item on earnings and profits does not depend on
whether it is taxable to the corporation. For example, tax-exempt income in-
creases earnings and profits. Realized though unrecognized losses reduce earnings
and profits. Intercorporate dividend deductions and percentage depletion do not
reduce earnings and profits. See Andrews, "Out of Its Earnings and Profits":
Some Refiections on the Taxation of Dividends, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1403, 1450 (1956).
[VOL. 41 :856
COMMENTS
tions and their share of the undistributed taxable income, and earnings
and profits are reduced by the amount taxed to the shareholders."
However, taxable income may not be computed in the same manner as
earnings and profits, as, for example, when the corporation receives
tax-exempt income or utilizes percentage depletion.31 In such cases,
the corporation may have current earnings and profits in excess of
taxable income. If not distributed to the shareholder, neither the
corporation nor the shareholder would be taxed on the excess. If dis-
tributed, the amounts would be taxed to the shareholder as dividends
because the corporation is not treated as a conduit.32 The shareholder
may, however, be able to take this excess out tax-free as a return of
capital by paying off debt, whereas stock redemptions run the risk of
being dividends.33 The same reasoning applies if the corporation had
accumulated earnings and profits in a prior year, whether as a normal
or subchapter S corporation.34
Current or accumulated earnings and profits are of particular rele-
vance in other situations. As noted, the shareholder is taxed both on
actual distributions and on any remaining undistributed taxable in-
' INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1373(b), provides that the shareholder "shall include
in his gross income .. . the amount he would have received as a dividend, if . . .
there had been distributed . . . an amount equal to the corporation's undistributed
taxable income.... " Section 1373(c) provides that "the term 'undistributed taxable
income' means taxable income.., mnnus the amount of money distributed as dividends
during the taxable year, to the extent that any such amount is a distribution out of
earnings and profits of the taxable year as specified in section 316(a) (2)."
Finally, § 1377(a) provides that "the accumulated earnings and profits of an
electing small business corporation . . . shall be reduced to the extent that its
undistributed taxable income for such year is required to be included in the
gross income of the shareholders ...
1 See note 29 supra.
'There is an exception made for capital gains. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(a),
provides that the shareholder may treat as capital gain his pro rata share of the corpora-
tion's long term capital gain.
' Assume A is the sole shareholder of X, a subchapter S corporation, which in its
first year (1960) has $50,000 taxable income and $10,000 tax-exempt income. If no
distribution is made, A will be taxed on $50,000, previously taxed income (PTI)
will be $50,000, and X's earnings and profits (E & P) at year's end will be
$10,000. If $60,000 is distributed, A will be taxed on $60,000. If, however, A
held a $10,000 debt instrument, X could distribute $10,000 to pay off the debt,
4 receiving a tax-free return of capital under § 1232. The remaining $50,000
would be reported by A as ordinary taxable income, whether distributed or not,
and X's E & P would remain at $10,000.
In this and subsequent footnotes, examples of the situations described in text
are given. Several of the examples were suggested by situations presented in
Moore & Sorlien, Adventures in Subchapter S and Section 1244, 14 TAx L. REv.
453 (1959). The regulations provide examples which demonstrate mechanics of
taxing distributions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1373 (g) (1959).
24Assume the preceding hypothetical altered as follows: The corporation had
accumulated $10,000 earnings and profits prior to making a subchapter S election
in 1960. During 1960, the corporation has $50,000 taxable income, but wishes to
distribute $60,000. Dividend treatment on $10,000 may be avoided by repayment
of $10,000 of debt.
1966]
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come.35 In subsequent years, tax-free withdrawals of cash may gener-
ally be made from this previously-taxed-income (PTI) account 0
When earnings and profits are present, some method is necessary to
earmark the source of a particular distribution. The regulations pro-
vide that cash distributions from PTI may be distributed tax-free not-
withstanding the existence of accumulated earnings and profits."'
However, a distribution cannot be made from PTI until all earnings
and profits of the current year have been exhausted." To help illus-
trate the difficulties this may cause, assume the shareholder has a PTI
account from a prior year. In the current year, the corporation, due to
receipt of tax-free life insurance proceeds, has an excess of earnings
and profits over taxable income. If the shareholder removes the entire
amount of the earnings in the form of cash, he will be forced to pay
dividend tax on the excess. Only after the excess is exhausted will he
be able to earmark the funds as coming from PTI30 Of course, if
the tax-free income is non-recurring and substantial in amount, the
shareholder may prefer to have the distribution made in the following
year because the excess will then be included in accumulated, rather
than current, earnings and profits and would thereby avoid the dangers
of dividend taxation." But if the shareholder needs the funds, they
could be removed by repayment of a debt even in the year the excess is
received, again avoiding dangers involved in redemption of stock.
Distributions in kind raise similar but even more serious difficulties.
The regulations provide that current earnings and profits are first allo-
cable to actual distributions of money and then ratably to constructive
dividends and distributions in kind and finally to any distribution in
exchange for stock. 1 If current earnings and profits exceed taxable in-
See note 30 supra.
I TNT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(d) (1), provides that the corporation:
may distribute . . . to any shareholder all or any portion of the shareholder's
net share of the corporation's undistributed taxable income for taxable years
prior to the taxable year in which such distribution is made. Any such
distribution shall . . . be considered a distribution which is not a dividend,
but the earnings and profits of the corporation shall not be reduced by reason
of any such distribution.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1959).
Ibid.
"Assume the hypothetical in note 33 supra. In 1961, the corporation again
has $50,000 taxable income and $10,000 tax-exempt income. If $60,000 is dis-
tributed, A will be taxed on $60,000. This will be true even if no distributions
were made in 1960 and A had a $50,000 PTI account in 1961.
" Continuing with the hypothetical in note 39 supra, if X has made no
distributions in 1960 and 1961, A will have $100,000 PTI. In 1962 X again
has taxable income of $50,000 and distributes $70,000. It would be possible to
earmark $20,000 as coming from PTI, despite the presence of $20,000 accumulated
earnings and profits.
4' This is the "three tier" system. Treas. Reg. § 1.1373-1 (e) provides:
[VOL. 41 : 856
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come, and if the value of a distribution in kind likewise exceeds taxable
income, the excess earnings and profits will require dividend treatment.
This, of course, is identical with the consequences of a cash distribu-
tion.12 However, the regulations further provide that only cash distri-
butions may qualify as distributions from the PTI account. 43 Thus,
if the distribution in kind would be covered by PTI, but there are
current or accumulated earnings and profits, the distribution will be
treated as a dividend. It would no longer be possible to wait a year, as
recommended for cash distributions,44 and then designate the distribu-
tion as made from PTI. It would, however, be possible to use the
property involved to pay off or reduce shareholder-held-debt without
subjecting the shareholder to dividend treatment.45
The foregoing illustrates only one of several difficulties with the
PTI account. The account is personal to the shareholder and disap-
pears if he ceases to be a shareholder, whether by transfer or death.46
Moreover, if the election is terminated, the account is wiped out and
distributions will be from earnings and profits until exhausted.47 Fur-
ther, the account is reduced by both prior and subsequent losses which
have been passed through to the shareholder.4' For these reasons, it
may appear desirable to have the corporation distribute all of its
earnings in the current year.49 If these funds are needed in the busi-
ness, as is usual with a new enterprise, the shareholder may return
(1) Earnings and profits of the taxable year are first allocated to the actual
distributions of money .... (2) The excess of such earnings and profits over
such actual distributions of money is allocated ratably to the constructive distribu-
tion of undistributed taxable income and actual distributions of property other
than money.... (3) The remainder of such earnings and profits is available to be
allocated to distributions in exchange for stock ....
'
2 Assume the facts of the hypothetical in note 33 snpra. In 1960 X distributes
land worth $60,000, instead of cash. The land has a basis of $10,000. The current
earnings and profits are $60,000 and are allocated ratably between the undistributed
taxable income of $50,000 and the distribution in kind, valued at $60,000. Thus,$27,273 of undistributed taxable income will be a dividend and $32,727 of the
distribution in kind will likewise be treated as a dividend. A pays dividend
taxes on $60,000, just as he would if $60,000 cash had been distributed.
'
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(b) (1959).
"See note 40 srupra and accompanying text.
"'Assume X has $10,000 accumulated earnings and profits prior to making a
subchapter S election in 1960. In 1960, X has taxable income of $50,000 and
makes no distributions. In 1961, X has no taxable income but distributes land
worth $50,000 with a basis of $10,000. Although A has $50,000 of PTI, he pays
dividend taxes on $10,000. However, A could remove the property tax-free by
using it to repay a debt.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(e) (1959).
"n INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1375(d) (1), only "an electing small business
corporation" may make distributions from PTI. If the corporation is disqualified
but later makes another election, the original PTI account is not restored. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-4(d) (2) (1959).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1375n(d) (2).
"See Moore & Sorlien, .ntpra note 33, at 472; Anthoine, supra note 9, at 1163-65.
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them to the corporation in the form of a capital contribution or in-
debtedness. If this is done solely to avoid the dangers to the PTI ac-
count, the Commissioner might argue that, regardless of the form of
the advances, the transaction was a "sham" and thus the PTI account
remained unchanged." Alternatively, it has been suggested that, if the
advances are in the form of debt, the Commissioner could invoke the
thin capitalization doctrine. 1 This suggestion should not be accepted
without some analysis of the situations in which debt might offer ad-
vantages.
If the corporation has no accumulated earnings and profits and if
current earnings and profits and taxable income are identical, then
the funds withdrawn from PTI could be returned by the shareholder as
either a loan or a capital contribution, because without earnings and
profits, a stock redemption would be identical to repayment of a debt. 2
Thus, it would be advantageous to use debt rather than stock only
when the corporation had accumulated or excess current earnings.5
Similar reasoning applies if the corporation is disqualified. If, at the
time the corporation terminates its subchapter S status, there are no
accumulated earnings, the corporation immediately could redeem stock
or repay debt with identical results. 4
The treatment of losses passed through to the shareholders presents
another opportunity for manipulating advances so as to derive a tax
benefit. The shareholder may deduct corporate losses from his per-
sonal income only to the extent of his adjusted basis in his share of the
' See SuRREY & WARREN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 1461. It has also been
suggested that the transaction might be regarded as the distribution of a corporate
obligation rather than money. BIrTKER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 417.
' See Moore & Sorlien, supra note 33, at 473; Goodson, Scheifly & Thompson,
Planning with Subchapter S in 1960, U. So. CAL. 12TH TAx INST. 165, 170
(1960). It should be noted that the writers, when referring to the use of the
"thin capitalization doctrine" in such situations, may be using the term simply
to indicate that certain uses of debt may be subject to challenge. However, the
danger of this use of the term is that it makes the normal thin capitalization cases
appear to be direct precedents, obscuring analysis of precisely what uses, if any,
of debt are involved.
' Assume X has $50,000 taxable income in 1962, and no accumulated earnings
and profits. A has $25,000 PTI from 1961. X distributes $75,000 in 1962. A
pays dividend taxes on $50,000 and receives $25,000 tax-free as a distribution
from PTI. A returns $25,000 to X receiving stock. In 1963, X again has $50,000
taxable income, and redeems $25,000 of A's stock. In 1963, A will be taxed on$50,000 as actual or constructive dividends and earnings and profits will thereby
be reduced to zero. Because there are no earnings and profits, $25,000 will be a
tax-free return of capital.
nIt is assumed that the shareholder's basis in his stock has not been reduced
by losses passed through to him. For discussion of the impact of losses, see note
56 infra and accompanying text.
" Failure to meet any one of the qualification requirements automatically term-
inates the election. Thus, for example, a transfer to an eleventh shareholder or to
[VOL.. 41 : 856
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stock and debt of the corporation. 5 If losses exceed this basis, the
excess is wasted because no carryover is allowed. Thus, if the share-
holder's basis has been reduced to zero because of prior losses and he
wishes to utilize current losses, he could advance funds sufficient to
cover the loss. In the following year the funds could be returned. The
effect of this transaction would be to provide an ordinary loss in the
current year at the cost of a capital gain in the next year. 6 As with
PTI withdrawals followed by returns, the Commissioner could attack
such a transaction as a "sham" whose tax consequences should be dis-
regarded.57 But if the advance is in the form of debt, and the use of
debt is attacked under the thin capitalization doctrine, only the exist-
ence of accumulated earnings would make it more advantageous to use
debt rather than stockY8
A more sophisticated method for utilizing losses might be devised.
Assume the initial capital structure involves a high debt/equity ratio
with the shareholder holding all the instruments. The corporation
suffers losses which the shareholder deducts from his personal income,
reducing his basis in stock and then in debt.59 The shareholder ad-
vances additional funds evidenced by stock instruments. The stock
is qualified under section 1244 as small business stock.6" The funds
a corporation will be disqualifying. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b) (3) (1959).
Voluntary revocation is provided for in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 137 2 (e) (2)
and requires unanimous consent by the shareholders no later than the end of the
first month of the corporation's taxable year. The ease of arranging for a dis-
qualification may substantially nullify the procedure required by § 1372(e) (2).
See BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 408.
SINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §1374(c) (2). By expressly allowing the share-
holder to take losses up to the basis of debt which he holds, that provision,
along with § 1376(b) (2), makes it clear that at least some shareholder-held debt
is permissible under subchapter S. See Salkin, What the courts and the Con-
missioner have been saying about Subchapter S, 24 J. TAxATIoN 116, 117 (1966).
'Assume A has a total investment in X of $100,000. In its first year, 1960, X
loses $100,000 which A deducts from his personal gross income in accordance with
§ 1374, thereby reducing his basis in both his stock and debt to zero. In 1961, it be-
comes apparent that X will lose an additional $25,000. A advances $25,000 in the form
of debt, and thus can deduct $25,000 as an ordinary loss from his gross income. A's
basis in the new debt is reduced to zero. In 1962, X repays the debt, giving A a $25,000
capital gain. The same result would following if A advanced the $25,000 in the form
of stock.
' See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
" Assume the facts in note 56 supra, altered as follows. In 1962, X has $50,000
taxable income and $25,000 tax-free income and distributes $75,000. The $25,000 may
be removed tax-free by repayment of debt whereas a $25,000 stock redemption would
result in a dividend.
It should be emphasized that the examples are merely intended to illustrate techni-
cal possibilities. In the above situation, success may depend on whether the trans-
action may be given a bona fide appearance. If the funds are put to use, the arrange-
ment may succeed. It is doubtful that a "loan" on Dec. 31 and a "repayment" on Jan.
15 would be accepted. See Moore & Sorlien, supra note 33, at 475-76.
' See note 55 supra and accompanying text
' Roughly, IrT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1244, allows an individual to deduct any loss
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are used to pay off the debt instruments held by the shareholder in
his capacity as a creditor. This will result in a capital gain equal to the
amount of the difference between the basis of the debt as reduced by
the loss deduction, and the face amount of the debt instrument. The
corporation then goes bankrupt, entitling the shareholder to a section
1244 deduction." The sum effect is two ordinary loss deductions and
a single capital gain.62 Despite technical compliance with Code pro-
visions, it would seem difficult to show such a transaction was not
solely tax motivated.
II. THE Gamman SOLUTION
The foregoing illustrates situations where there may or may not be
advantages to debt in a subchapter S corporation. The examples are
not all-inclusive but they demonstrate that most of the advantages of
debt arise when the corporation has accumulated earnings and profits
or when there is an excess of current earnings and profits over taxable
income." While it is true that there are occasions when debt may be
used to special advantage, in general, the benefits do not appear as
great as those encountered under normal tax treatment. Moreover, it
would seem that most of the benefits could be derived within the range
of a safe debt/equity ratio. Thus, application of the thin capitalization
doctrine in all cases where a subchapter S corporation has a high ratio
seems inappropriate. Furthermore, the penalties may be much more
severe. Not only is an actual or potential tax benefit lost, but also
under the regulations disqualification occurs and the advantages of
subchapter S status are lost. These factors may suggest rejection of
the thin capitalization doctrine under subchapter S.
Before weighing the merits of this approach, an alternative solution
to the problem must be considered. Disqualification depends upon the
existence of a second class of stock, not simply on finding an instru-
on § 1244 stock as an ordinary, rather than capital loss. The stock must be qualified as
"Small Business Corporation" stock. Losses are limited to $25,000 per year for an un-
married individual and $50,000 per year for married couples filing a joint return.
See generally Moore & Sorlien, supra note 33, at 489-503.
"See Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(a)-1 (a) (1960), which includes worthlessness within
the "sale or exchange' language of § 1244(a).
'Assume A has a total investment in X of $50,000 in the form of $25,000 of
debt and $25,000 of stock. In 1960 X loses $50,000 which A deducts from his gross
income as an ordinary loss and reduces his total basis to zero. In 1961, X loses $25,000.
A contributes $25,000 in the form of stock which is qualified under § 1244(c). This
enables A to claim the $25,000 operating loss deduction. The funds are used to repay
the $25,000 loan which results in a $25,000 capital gain. X fails and A deducts an
additional $25,000 loss on the worthlessness of the § 1244 stock.
See Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporatioits,
13 VAND. L. REv. 185, 191-93 (1959).
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ment is stock rather than debt. As noted, the regulations attempt to
foreclose the issue by stating that debt found to be actually stock "will
constitute a second class of stock." 4 This conclusion may be sound as
a practical matter, but it is not logically necessary. Thus, it has been
argued that, even if an advance is in fact stock, it should be held to
constitute merely a contribution of capital to the existing class of
stocky This line of reasoning was employed in a recent Tax Court
decision, W. C. Gamman,0 by seven of the ten majority judges.
The corporation made a subchapter S election in 1961 after several
years of unsuccessful operations. The shareholders-taxpayers had
made advances over several years, the capital structure by 1962 being
about 240,000 dollars of debt evidenced by six per cent demand notes
and 400 dollars of stock. No interest had ever been paid on the notes
and no attempt had been made to collect the principal. The Commis-
sioner disallowed loss deductions taken by the shareholder on the
ground that the purported debt was a disqualifying second class of
stock.
The Tax Court held for the taxpayer but there was no majority
agreement on the proper rationale for reaching the result. Judge
Drennen, joined by four other judges, found that the advances were in
fact risk capital rather than bona fide debt, but that the advances did
not constitute a disqualifying second class of stock. Judge Dawson,
joined by Judge Hoyt, substantially agreed with this conclusion, em-
phasizing the harshness of the Commissioner's interpretation. Con-
curring in the result, Judge Withey, joined by two other judges, con-
cluded that the advances were not risk capital at all but were true
debt and thus, no question arose as to whether they constituted a
second class of stock. Finally, in a five judge dissent, Judge Raum,
accepting the premise that the advances were risk capital, argued that
the terms of the notes differed from the terms of the stock and thus
the instruments were a second class of stock.
Judge Drennen's opinion dealt first with the Commissioner's reliance
on regulation 1.1371-1(g).'7 Judge Drennen could find nothing in the
statute or the legislative history requiring that debt found in fact to be
stock must necessarily be a second class of stock, and thus found the
regulation invalid. Considering the status of the advances more gener-
' See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
'See Manly, Election under subchapter S can eliminate thin-incorporation
problem, 9 J. TAXATION 322, 323 n. 2 (1958).
' 46 T.C.-, No. 1, CCH TAx CT. REP., decision 27,900, P-H TAx CT. REP.
46.1 (1966).
"See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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ally, he concluded that the advances were placed at the risk of the
business and were not true debt. Since this conclusion was reached by
disregarding the explicit terms of the notes, he decided that the terms
should be disregarded altogether so that the advances were simply
contributions to the existing common stock. Buttressing this conclu-
sion was evidence that the taxpayers had treated the advances as they
had stock, so that in reality, no differences existed in the rights or
interests of each. The opinion ends by distinguishing Henderson and
Catalina, both of which reached a contrary result, by saying that both
had accepted the regulation itself without inquiry and thus were not
binding authority as to its validity.
Judge Raum's dissent rejected the conclusion that if the advances
constituted stock, they need not be a second class of stock. That the
taxpayers did not intend to enforce the notes did not mean that they
could not legally do so at some later time when the corporation had
sufficient funds.
It is apparent that the conflict between the opinions turns on the
proper effect to be given to the terms of the instruments. In a sense,
the difference is in the breadth of the approach to the problem: Judge
Drennen expressly restricted himself to the facts of the case before him
and did not speculate on how the terms might later be enforced;
Judge Raum preferred a more sweeping approach.
Limited to the facts of the case, the result appears equitable. The
advances were pro rata, the same persons held both the notes and the
stock, and there was no apparent tax benefit derived from using debt
rather than stock during the years in question. 8 With the corporation
losing money it might be argued that the taxpayers would have a
favorable position as creditors in the event of bankruptcy. However,
the taxpayers had agreed to subordinate their claims, 9 and in any
event, bankruptcy courts would probably subordinate shareholder-
creditors to others when capitalization was as thin as in Gamman.'
The tax benefit which the Commissioner sought to disallow was the
The continuing advances to the corporation may have enabled the taxpayers to
utilize losses which would otherwise be unavailable because their basis in stock
and debt had previously been reduced to zero. This possibility was not mentioned
by the court. The Commissioner did argue that losses coupled with debt instruments
presented possibilities for manipulation, but the argument was not related to the facts
of the case. Brief for Respondent, p. 25. In any event, it appears that the losses would
have been available to the taxpayers regardless of the form of the advances because the
corporation lost money from its inception. See the example in note 56 supra.
' W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C.- , No. 1, CCH TAx CT. REP., decision 27,900 at 2213
(1966).
" See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) ; Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elect.
Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) ; Gannett Co. v. Larry, 221 F2d 269 (2d Cir. 1955).
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deduction of corporate losses, a benefit flowing from subchapter S
status, not from a thin capital structure. Disqualification in such
circumstances seems a harsh result.71 Nonetheless, closer analysis re-
veals that although the result in Gamman is equitable, there are flaws
in the logic of finding the advances a mere contribution to the existing
class of stock.
In Gamman, as in the typical thin capitalization case,72 the disputed
debt instruments were held pro rata by the shareholders. Further-
more, all of the shareholders treated the debt in the same manner.
However, there seems to be no reason why one of the shareholders
could not insist on enforcing the terms of the instrument. Under state
law the instruments apparently would remain debt instruments.73 For
tax purposes they could be treated as stock but they would seem to be
equivalent to preferred stock. 74 Similar considerations apply if, in-
stead of holding the notes themselves, the shareholders transfer them
to a third party. Hypothesizing from Gamman, the new holder would
be entitled to six per cent interest, the right to payment on demand,
and probably liquidation preference. The normal thin capitalization
cases support the conclusion that transfers of purported debt instru-
ments held to be stock are transfers of preferred stock.75
The transfer of disputed notes at least theoretically may run afoul
of other requirements of subchapter S. If the notes are found to be
stock, then the holder presumably would be counted as a shareholder
with reference to the limitation of a total of ten shareholders. Simi-
larly, an even more drastic effect would be that the "shareholder"
would not have consented to the election.76 In these cases, the terms of
the notes would be immaterial. Thus, a transfer of notes found to be
stock might disqualify the corporation even if the terms were identical
with those of the original stock. Once it is accepted that stock classifi-
cation implies preferred stock classification, it is clear that Gamman
disregards the plain statutory requirement of a single class of stock.
7 See Judge Dawson's concurring opinion, 46 T.C.-, No. 1, CCH TAX Cr. REP.,
decision 27,900 at 2216 (1966).7 BIrrxFR, FEDERAL INCOmiE TAxATiro OF CORORATIONS AND SHAxHOLDERS 115
(1965).
See generally BiTTKY.R, op. cit. supra note 72, at 406.
' See Anthoine, Federal Tax Legislation of 1958: The Corporate Election and
Collapsible Amncndmnent, 58 COLUm. L. REv. 1146, 1152 (1958); Goodson, Scheifly &
Thompson, supra note 51, at 171.
"See, e.g., Mary Duerr, 30 T.C. 944 (1958); Texoma Supply Co., 17 CCH Tax
Ct. fem. 147 (1958) ; Ben P. Gale, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 518 (1956).
11 INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1372(a), provides that the election is valid only if all




Judicial refusal to give literal effect to statutory language is not a
novel" nor necessarily unsound practice, but it is an exception which
should be made only when literal application of the language contra-
dicts the broad statutory purpose and no other solution is possible."
If this criticism of Gamman is accurate, then it is necessary to
return to the initial issue of whether a disputed advance should be
treated as stock or debt. Although there are occasions when debt
offers special advantages under subchapter S,s0 in general, the benefits
of a high debt/equity ratio are not as great as under normal tax treat-
ment. What is needed then is a means of preventing abuses in the
occasional situations without at the same time imposing unwarranted
penalties in situations where abuse is at best only remotely possible.
The thin capitalization doctrine, as it has been developed in normal
situations, cannot be uncritically read into subchapter S. Gamman
appears analytically unsound. Thus, a new approach based upon the
special features of subchapter S should be developed.
III. T-E RATIONALE FOR THE ONE CLASS REQUIREMENT
A preliminary step is to ascertain, if possible, the rationale behind
the one class requirement. Unfortunately the legislative history is
meager. The 1958 Senate Report on subchapter S says no more than
that to qualify as a "small business corporation," the corporation could
not "have more than one class of stock.""1 Subchapter S, however,
represented the culmination of many suggestions to permit sharehold-
ers of closely held corporations to be taxed basically as partnerships.82
In 1954, when considering a provision similar to subchapter S, the
reports discussed the one class requirement in somewhat greater de-
tail. The explanation given was that "if this requirement were not
made, undistributed current earnings could not be taxed to the share-
holders without great complications," 3 and further, "In order to avoid
possible complications in the taxation of preferred stock dividends not
See, e.g., Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
s It has been said, with reference to the "business purpose" doctrine of Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), "[I]t is hard to see how an Internal Revenue
Code can be successfully applied in the world without the safeguards afforded by
the Gregory doctrine and its various facets." SURREY & WAREN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION, CASES AND MArEMUALS 1545 (1962).
See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV.
985, 995 (1956).
' See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
' S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, 1958-3 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS
4877 (1958).
"BITTKER, op. cit. supra note 72, at 402.
s' S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 453, 1954-3 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs
5097 (1954).
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earned in the year distributed, only corporations having one class of
stock outstanding may qualify."84 It is reasonable to regard these
statements as applicable to the one class requirement of subchapter
S, both because of the similarity of the provisions, and because alloca-
tion problems would exist if two classes of stock were present.85 Thus,
avoiding allocation problems is a prerequisite of any solution to debt/
equity disputes.
There is an additional reason for the one class requirement, although
it is of more indefinite content. Under the Senate version of the
1954 provisions, each shareholder had to be "actively engaged in the
conduct of the business of the corporation-i.e., such shareholders
must all occupy managerial positions." '86 This requirement was not
enacted, but to a certain extent, it may be practically accomplished
through the combination of a limit of ten shareholders and one class
of stock. Arguably, the limitations are intended to force any corpora-
tion, seeking to spread beneficial interest among a large number of
parties, to use normal corporate taxation provisions. To the extent that
debt may be used in the place of preferred stock, its use may contra-
dict the policy of keeping the corporation equivalent to a small partner-
ship.8 7
IV. SUGGESTED APPROACH TO ANALYZING DEBT-OR-EQUITY ISSUES
The final portion of this Note will suggest an approach to resolving
disputes over the effect of extensive use of "debt" instruments by a
subchapter S corporation. The proposal is made in two parts. The
first focuses on the significance of a high debt/equity ratio in a sub-
chapter S corporation. The second will consider briefly the use of
debt for functions normally performed by preferred stock.
A. The Significance of High Debt/Equity Ratios
The first step of the proposal may be stated quite simply: if a high
debt/equity ratio exists and the thin capitalization doctrine is argued,
the Commissioner should be required to show that the debt instruments
are providing a tax benefit which could not be obtained by the sub-
" Id. at 119, 1954-3 U. S. CoDE CO G. & An. NEWs 4752 (1954).
'For analysis of the legislative history in relation to differences in voting
rights, see Note, Stockholder Agreements and Subchapter S Corporations, 19 TAx
L. REv. 391, 395-99 (1964).
" S. Rep. No. 1662, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 453, 1954-3 U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws
5096 (1954).
6' See Price, Subchapter S-Some Policy Questions, 3 Tax Revision Compendium,
House Ways and feans Committee 1731 (1959).
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stituted use of stock. If no benefit is present, the debt-or-stock issue
should not be reached. The effect of the proposal may be illustrated by
applying it to the Gamman facts. The deduction claimed by the tax-
payers was their share of the corporation's operating losses. The dis-
puted advances were made in the form of debt. If stock instruments
are substituted entirely for the debt instruments, the taxpayers would
claim precisely the same deduction. Thus, the case should be dis-
missed.
The justification for this approach is that if debt or stock produce
identical tax consequences, the ratio, in and of itself, is of no tax
significance. In the normal thin capitalization case, the Commissioner
disallows a deduction flowing from the use of debt, not from a particu-
lar capital structure. Absent a loss of revenue due to a tax benefit
flowing from debt, the Commissioner would have no reason to bring
the taxpayer to court. The situation should be no different under
subchapter S. Of course, the Commissioner is claiming a loss of reve-
nue, but the loss is wholly unrelated to the debt; the taxpayer would be
claiming the same deduction regardless of whether the instrument is
stock or debt.
A possible argument against the proposal is that at some future time
the debt may be used to actual advantage and therefore the potentiality
of abuse should be eliminated."8 The examples in Part I demonstrate
that a tax benefit from the use of debt is possible but will occur less
frequently under subchapter S than under normal taxation. In view
of the limited advantages possible, it seems unfair to subject the
shareholder of a subchapter S corporation to the penalty of disqualifi-
cation solely because his capital structure might provide a benefit in the
future. 89 Furthermore, regardless of the practical need for a deter-
rent, the tax law is concerned with actual abuses. The Supreme Court
has aptly stated:9"
It is not mere existence of an opportunity to do wrong that brings the
rule into play; it is the unconscionable use of the opportunity ... that
deprives the wrongdoer of the fruits of his wrong.
An advantage of the proposal is that the difficult issue-whether
the instrument is debt or stock-will not have to be decided in every
case. The first question is whether the use of debt itself provides a tax
See Brief for Petitioner, p. 26, W. C. Garnman, 46 T.C.- , No. 1 (1966).
'In W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C.- , No. 1, CCH TAx CT. REP., decision 27,900 (1966),
Dawson, J., concurring, stressed the harshness of the Commissioner's position. See
Salkin, supra note 55, at 117.
Gomstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211, 229 (1948).
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benefit. If the answer is negative, there is no need for going farther.
If a tax benefit later occurs, the issue may be reconsidered at that
time. Until this occurs, an attack on the use of debt is essentially pre-
mature and should be dismissed.
This analysis is consistent with the policy of avoiding allocation
problems. Allocation problems do not arise as long as there is only
one class of stock. Until determined otherwise, a debt instrument will
be presumed legitimate and allocation handled accordingly. This pre-
sumption needs no judicial stamp of approval when it is not contested
in an appropriate manner.
Up to this point, the argument might be summarized by saying that,
until an actual tax benefit flowing from the use of debt is shown, there
is no genuine issue of debt-or-stock designation. Attention now shifts
to situations where an actual benefit is present, and thus where there
is a genuine debt-or-stock issue.
The simple approach to deciding the genuine stock-or-debt issue is
to use as precedents the normal thin capitalization cases. Before ac-
cepting this approach, significant differences should be noted in the
issue when presented in a subchapter S context as opposed to the
normal corporate tax situation. Most advantages from the use of debt
depend upon the existence of current or accumulated earnings and
profits.9 Debt permits tax-free withdrawal of funds instead of taxable
stock redemptions. There have been "normal" thin capitalization cases
which have involved challenged "loan repayments."9 " The thin capital-
ization doctrine has been developed largely, however, in cases involving
challenged interest deductions.9 Serious doubts have been raised as to
whether identical issues are involved in the two situations.94 The
distinction may not be critical under normal corporate tax provisions
because it appears that the interest deductions will be challenged
before loan repayments occur 5 Under subchapter S, however, the
interest deduction issue is moot, and thus the instances where an
actual benefit is likely to occur will pose only the issue of the legitimacy
of loan repayments. To the extent that the "normal" thin capitaliza-
tion cases fail to distinguish the situations, their application will blur
the issue under subchapter S.
9 1See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jennings v. United States, 272 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1959); Estate of
Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955), rev'd, 239 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1956).
1 Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedtess to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and





Another difference in the debt-or-stock issue relates to the impact of
the penalties. Under subchapter S, holding the instrument to be debt
may result in what might be called a "double penalty", i.e., loss of both
the actual benefit which would accompany debt classification and,
because of disqualification, the benefits of subchapter S status. In
the normal case, the penalty is directly related to the benefit sought,
and thus the size of the benefit is unimportant. Under subchapter S,
however, there is no necessary relation between the "two" penalties.
For example, the Commissioner may show that debt rather than stock
classification gives a one hundred dollar benefit. Disqualification, on
the other hand, may result in a tax cost of 1,000 dollars to the taxpayer.
A court might feel that disqualification was an overly harsh penalty.
The Gamman solution is attractive in such a case because it would
deny the benefit of debt classification but would not disqualify the
corporation. Because of the difficulties with Gamman, however, an
alternative may be preferable.
The severity of the double penalty should be carefully weighed
against the seriousness of the abuse. If the debt classification provides
a benefit which is small in comparison with the penalty of disqualifica-
tion, the court might allow the instruments to stand as debt. An imme-
diate objection to such a process is that an instrument could be held
debt under subchapter S whereas it would have been held stock in a
normal situation. Further, once the instrument was found to be debt,
the corporation could terminate the subchapter S election and rely on
the finding for normal corporate tax purposes. However, the very exist-
ence of the thin capitalization doctrine demonstrates that the classifica-
tion of an instrument represents a judgment of how tax policy is served
by the classification. If this is accepted, a court should be willing to
admit frankly that the same instrument may be debt for purposes of
subchapter S and stock for purposes of normal corporate taxation. It
follows that the subchapter S classification should not necessarily be
res judicata in subsequent litigation under normal corporate tax pro-
visions.
It appears that neither this solution nor Gamman is free from
difficulties. As noted, 6 Gamman in effect disregards the statutory
limitation of one class of stock. The proposal, while it does not infringe
on the statutory language, does force an all-or-nothing approach to
limiting the tax benefits of debt classification and subchapter S status.
See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
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Tested against the policy of avoiding allocation difficulties, the alterna-
tive proposal seems preferable. Under Gamman, allocation problems
arise as soon as there is a transfer of an instrument or a shareholder
seeks to enforce the differing terms of the instrument as he is able to do
under state law. Allocation problems, of course, cannot arise under the
alternative proposal because the instrument is either debt, or sub-
chapter S status is lost.
B. Using Debt to Perform the Function of Preferred Stock
The one class requirement prevents a subchapter S corporation from
arranging a capital structure which provides the benefits of preferred
stock. 7 One or more classes of preferred stock allow for considerable
flexibility in allocating risks of loss, power of control, and participation
in the proceeds of the business.' s Subchapter S shareholders may seek
the same flexibility through carefully drafted debt instruments. The
rationale behind the use of debt is essentially different from the ration-
ale behind the earlier examples involving high debt/equity ratios. Tax
considerations may be of minimal importance. For example, an em-
ployer may desire to allow employee participation in the business. 9
When tax considerations are important, the issue may appear similar
to the cases dealing with hybrid securities, where the terms of the
instruments were essentially those of preferred stock, gearing "inter-
est" payments to income and expressly providing for subordination to
general creditors.100 However, under subchapter S, the attack on such
securities should be viewed as based on a separate ground. In the
hybrid cases, the tax considerations which prompted the hybrid securi-
ties were attempts to derive the normal tax benefits of debt from what,
from a business point of view, was in substance preferred stock.'0 '
Under subchapter S the attempt may be simply to acquire the non-tax
benefits of preferred stock. Of course, hybrids may be utilized in one
of the situations considered earlier. In such cases, they would present
the same tax avoidance problem as would orthodox debt instruments.
Their specific use as preferred stock possibly may be attacked on the
'" See Caplin, Subchapter S and Its Effect on the Capitalization of Corporations,
13 VAND. L. REv. 185, 193-94 (1959).
"For a general discussion of the characteristics of securities, in both their
business and tax aspects, see BAKER & CaY, CopwovRioNs, CASES AND MATERIALS
867-87 (3d ed. abr. 1959).
' See Caplin, supra note 97, at 194.
I(.) See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) ; Gregg Co. of
Del. v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956), affirming 23 T.C. 170 (1954).
101 Customarily, the cases involve challenged interest deductions. See cases dis-
cussed in Goldstein, supra note 93, at 10-17.
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ground that they allow a subchapter S corporation to function as a
normal, widely-held corporation, contrary to the statutory purpose as
evidenced in the one class and ten-or-less shareholder requirements.
This argument may be made without regard to whether there is an
actual or potential tax-avoidance problem. Furthermore, it has little
relation to the debt/equity ratio factor of the thin capitalization doc-
trine. Thus, if it is determined that there is a policy against the
flexible arrangements possible in a capital structure employing pre-
ferred stock, new criteria will be necessary. The uncertainty of the
concept of "small business" 102 under subchapter S makes it impossible
to set out precise rules. Perhaps as a general rule, the two items which
should be looked at most closely would be the voting rights 0 3 and
interest rights given by the disputed debt instruments. As a practical
matter, since most large businesses will necessarily operate as normal
corporations, uses of debt in all but extreme cases will not seriously
affect administration of subchapter S provisions.
' There is no limit on the size of a corporation's income, assets, net worth or
other financial characteristics. Binmr, op. cit. mpra note 72, at 403.
'o See Rev. Rul. 63-226, 1963-2 Cum. Bu.L. 341. But see Note, Stockholder Agree-
inents and Subchapter S Corporations, 19 TAx L. REv. 391 (1964).
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